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NOTES & COMMENTS
Atherton v. FDIC: The Final Word on Bank Officer and
Director Liability?
I. INTRODUCTION
In the late 1980s, Congress reacted to the growing savings
and loan crisis by passing the Financial Institution Reform,
Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989' (FIRREA).2  Stories of
mismanagement and outright fraud by officers and directors fueled
sentiments that their conduct must be controlled to ensure the
financial future of savings and loan associations (S&Ls).' Buried
within the 371 pages of legislation, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) announced
the standard of care for bank officers and directors4 and 12 U.S.C.
§ 1821(d)(2)(A)(i) allowed the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC)
to pursue claims against them personally.5 Since FIRREA's passage,
the ambiguous language of § 1821(k) has spawned extensive
commentary and litigation and resulted in a split among the circuit
courts.7
1. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
2. See generally David B. Fischer, Comment Bank Director Liability Under FIRREA:
A New Defense for Directors and Officers of Insolvent Depository Institutions-Or a
Tighter Noose?, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1703 (1992) (detailing the history of the FIRREA
legislation).
3. See id. at 1706-07.
4. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (1994). The statute reads:
A director or officer of an insured depository institution may be held
personally liable for monetary damages in any civil action by [FDIC as
receiver] for gross negligence, including any similar conduct or conduct
that demonstrates a greater disregard of a duty of care (thap gross
negligence) including intentional tortious conduct, as such terms are
defined and determined under applicable [s]tate law. Nothing in this
paragraph shall impair or affect any right of the Corporation under other
applicable law.
Id.
5. See id. § 1821(d)(2)(A)(i).
6. See generally Warren L. Dennis & Jeremy R. Feinberg, The Evolving Standard of
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Recently, in Atherton v. FDIC,' the Supreme Court resolved
some of the ambiguity. Specifically, the Court held that state law
standards of care apply to officers and directors of state and federally
chartered S&Ls.9 In reaching this conclusion, the Court determined
that federal common law standards in this area no longer exist.'
Thus, the Atherton decision establishes that bank officers and
directors are subject to the § 1821(k) "gross negligence" standard of
care, as well as any applicable stricter state law standards of care.
Part II of this Note discusses the facts and holding of
Atherton." Part III examines the background law and split among
the lower courts over the applicable standard of care for bank officers
and directors. 2 Part IV analyzes the significance of Atherton for
bank officers and directors. 3 Finally, Part V concludes that Atherton
raises as many questions as it answers. 4
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In Atherton, the petitioners were a group of former officers
and directors of a failed federal savings association known as City
Federal Savings Bank (City Federal). 5 Standing in place of the bank
as receiver, the RTC 6 brought this action in 1989 alleging that the
officers' actions or omissions amounted to gross negligence, simple
Care in Bank Officer and Director Liability Cases, in I FINANCIAL SERVICES LITIGATION:
NEW PRODUCTS, HOT ISSUES, HIGH EXPOSURE-COMMERCIAL INVESTMENT ISSUES,
CONSUMER CREDrr ISSUES, at 741 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No.
B-935, 1996); Fischer, supra note 2; Martin Lowy & Peter Lowy, Needed: A Standard of
Care for Bank, Thrift Officers and Directors, BANKING POL'Y REP., Aug. 5, 1996, available
in LEXIS, BANKNG Library, BNKPOL File; Ronald Stevens & Bruce Nielson, The
Standard of Care for Directors and Officers of Federally Chartered Depository
Institutions: It's Gross Negligence Regardless of Whether Section 1821(k) Preempts
Federal Common Law, 13 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 169 (1994).
7. See infra notes 107-32 and accompanying text.
8. 117 S. Ct. 666 (1997).
9. See id. at 676.
10. See id. at 666.
11. See infra notes 15-83 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 84-132 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 133-52 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 153-57 and accompanying text.
15. See Atherton, 117 S. Ct. at 669.
16. See id. "The respondent ... is now the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation-
the FDIC-which has replaced the Resolution Trust Corporation pursuant to a new federal
statute." Id. at 671 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(4)(A) (1994)).
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negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty. 7 Specifically, the RTC
alleged that the officers and directors considered, approved, and
oversaw the acquisition, development, and construction loans
resulting in $100 million in damages to City Federal."
At trial, the defendant officers and directors argued that
§ 1821(k) of FIRREA established a gross negligence standard of care
and, therefore, was intended to forbid actions amounting to only
simple negligence. 9 Agreeing with the officers and directors, the
district court dismissed all but the gross negligence claims.
2 °
On interlocutory appeal to the Third Circuit,2' the court
considered whether § 1821(k) preempts state law or supersedes
federal common law.2' The Third Circuit found that the RTC could
"seek recovery from officers and directors under all 'other applicable
laws,' including the less forgiving negligence and fiduciary duty
standard of care under state law and federal common law. ' 23 The
court stated that the plain meaning of the statute's savings clause
indicated that any law could still apply after § 1821(k).24
17. See id.
18. See RTC v. CityFed Fin. Corp., 57 F.3d 1231, 1237 (3d Cir. 1995), rev'd sub nom.
Atherton v. FDIC, 117 S. Ct. 666 (1997). The RTC's complaint alleged that the defendants
failed to "discharge their duties and obligations properly as officers and directors." Id. at
1236-37. Specifically, the defendants allegedly violated their duty of care by:
(1) failing to obtain and verify necessary financial information from
borrowers; (2) maintaining inadequate appraisal procedures; (3)
consistently loaning funds based on excessively high loan-to-value ratios
that violated mandatory limits placed on such ratios; (4) making repeated
imprudent long-range commitments to future lending or funding; (5)
failing to monitor loan disbursements and the ongoing status of projects
and loans; (6) improperly waiving risk limitations and other conditions
contained in loan commitments to certain borrowers; (7) failing to require
and verify that necessary permits and approvals were. obtained before
funding the loans; (8) improperly assessing the value of guarantees given
as security for the loans; and (9) not requiring adherence to the [b]ank's
lending policies and procedures.
Id. at 1237.
19. See Atherton, 117 S. Ct. at 669.
20. See id.
21. See id. The consolidated appeal to the Third Circuit was brought by City Federal, a
federal depository institution, and United Savings and Loan of Trenton, a New Jersey state
chartered thrift See CityFed, 57 F.3d at 1235. United Savings did not seek certiorari
following the Third Circuit's ruling that § 1821(k) does not supplant stricter state laws. See
Lowy & Lowy, supra note 6.
22. See CityFed, 57 F.3d at 1235.
23. Id. at 1237.
24. See id. at 1238; see also infra note 58 (quoting the language of the savings clause).
1998]
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Furthermore, the court noted that the legislative history indicates that
Congress, reacting to the growing trend in the states to protect
officers and directors from liability, intended to pass legislation that
would ensure that the RTC had a cause of action against negligent
individuals. 25 Thus, according to the Third Circuit, the City Federal
defendants could be subject to federal common law that was stricter
than gross negligence.26 Consequently, the Third Circuit reversed the
district court's ruling and concluded that the RTC could pursue any
claim available under federal common law.27 By finding that federal
common law still existed to govern the standard of liability for bank
officers and directors,28 the Third Circuit departed from the holdings
of other circuits.29
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to settle the dispute
between the circuits regarding the standard of care applicable to bank
officers and directors under § 1821(k).3 ° Justice Breyer, writing for a
nearly unanimous court,3' began the analysis by determining whether
federal common law, in the absence of § 1821(k), would articulate
the standard of corporate governance for federally chartered banks.32
Although the Court established a federal common law standard in
Briggs v. Spaulding,33 this holding and most federal common law did
25. See CityFed, 57 F.3d at 1238-39.
26. See id. at 1249. The Third Circuit also held that the United Savings defendants
could be subject to state laws applying a stricter standard than gross negligence. See id.
These defendants were no longer a party at the time of the Atherton decision. See supra
note 21.
27. See CityFed, 57 F.3d at 1249.
28. See id. Part of the court's reasoning for retaining federal common law was to avoid
an anomalous situation where bank officers and directors who are sued before receivership
are subject to a simple negligence standard, but bank officers and directors who are sued
after receivership are held to a gross negligence standard, if § 1821(k) supersedes federal
common law. See id. at 1246. The court found that Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132
(1891), announced the federal common law standard of care for bank officers and directors.
See CityFed, 57 F.3d at 1247 n.16.
29. See infra notes 107-32 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 107-32 and accompanying text (discussing the interpretation of
§ 1821(k) by the circuit courts).
31. See Atherton, 117 S. Ct. at 677. Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas concurred
in part and in the judgment, except for the majority's reliance on legislative history. See id.
at 676-77 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). They felt no
need to rely on contradictory legislative history when a plain reading of the statute clearly
points out the meaning of the savings clause in § 1821(k). See id.
32. See id. at 669-70.
33. 141 U.S. 132 (1891).
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not survive Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.34 The Court defined
federal common law as "a rule of decision that amounts, not simply
to an interpretation of a federal statute or a properly promulgated
administrative rule, but, rather to the judicial 'creation' of a special
federal rule of decision."35 The Court maintained that the creation of
a special rule is only justified when a "'significant conflict between
some federal policy or interest and the use of state law' exists.36 To
determine whether the Briggs standard survived Erie, the Court
examined each argument made by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) for the existence of a significant conflict that
would justify the use of federal common law.
First, the FDIC argued that federal common law would
provide uniformity among federally chartered financial institutions.37
The Court rejected this argument on two grounds. First, uniformity
would only be furthered by this federal rule for half of all banks,
since only half are federally chartered.38 Second, the federal banking
system has always functioned with disparities in the corporate
governance standard.39 Therefore, the Court concluded that no
overriding federal interest would be served by a federal common law
rule.
40
Next, the FDIC argued that only federal common law could
properly govern federally chartered banks.41 The Court traced the
history of banks in the United States and noted that since 1870
federally chartered banks have been subject to state law.42  The
34. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (holding that" [t]here is no federal general common law").
35. Atherton, 117 S. Ct. at 670.
36. Id. (quoting O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 80 (1994)).
37. See id. at 671.
38. See id. ("[A] federal standard that increases uniformity among [federally chartered
banks] would increase disparity with [state chartered banks]."). The Court cited a 1995
FDIC study that found approximately 1600 federally chartered and 1500 state chartered
institutions. See id.
39. See id. The Court said that state chartered banks are subject to the various laws of
each state. See id. Likewise, federally chartered banks are subject to the various lower
court interpretations of the Briggs standard. See id. Furthermore, the Court noted that the
Comptroller of the Currency "permits considerable disparity in the standard of care
applicable to federally chartered banks other than savings banks (which are under the
jurisdiction of the OTS)." Id.
40. See id. at 670-71.
41. See id. at 671.
42. See id. at 672. The Court cited National Bank v. Commonwealth as the first case
holding that federal banks "are subject to the laws of the [s]tate, and are governed in their
1998]
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historical use of state laws to govern the activities of federal banks
indicated to the Court that no significant conflict with federal policy
exists that justifies the use of federal common law.43
The FDIC also argued that applying the "internal affairs
doctrine" in the banking context would result in the use of federal
common law." This doctrine, normally used to settle conflict of law
issues for corporations, suggests that the controlling law is that of the
state of incorporation.45 By analogy, the FDIC would apply federal
common law to federally chartered banks.46 The Court, however,
found that this argument did not meet the legal requirement for the
creation of federal common law.47 In fact, the Court noted that this
analogy could even support a counter argument for the application of
state law.4
Finally, the FDIC noted that the Office of Thrift Supervision
(OTS)49 has applied the federal common law standard of Briggs to
savings and loan officers and directors." However, the Court was
not persuaded by this observation because the OTS was not
employing this standard based on any significant conflict between
daily course of business far more by the laws of the [s]tate than of the nation." See id.
(citing National Bank v. Commonwealth, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 353, 362 (1869)). After
National Bank, several cases have applied state laws to federally chartered institutions. See,
e.g., California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280 (1987) (holding that
state employment discrimination law applies to a federally chartered savings and loan
association); Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 252-53 (1944) (holding that a
Kentucky escheat statute applies to deposit accounts in a national bank); Wichita Royalty
Co. v. City Nat'l Bank, 306 U.S. 103, 107 (1939) (holding that state tort lawv applies for a
claim against directors of a national bank).
43. See Atherton, 117 S. Ct. at 672. The Court's history lesson on the application of
state laws to federally chartered institutions does not distinguish between banks and savings
associations. See id.
44. See id. at 673.
45. See id.
46. See id. This analogy had been drawn by several of the lower courts. See infra
notes 124-32 and accompanying text (discussing RTC v. Chapman, 29 F.3d 1120, 1123-24
(7th Cir. 1994)).
47. See Atherton, 117 S. Ct. at 673 ("To find ajustification for federal common law in
this argument, however, is to substitute analogy or formal symmetry for the controlling
legal requirement, namely, the existence of a need to create federal common law arising out
of a significant conflict or threat to a federal interest.").
48. See id. An analogy can be drawn between the state of incorporation of an ordinary
business and the state of the principal place of business or main office for federal banking
institutions. See id.
49. The OTS has the authority to fine or remove from office the officers and directors
of a savings and loan for breach of fiduciary duty. See id.
50. See id.
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federal and state laws or pursuant to authority delegated by
Congress.5
Having considered and rejected the FDIC's arguments for
federal common law, the Court went even further to point out that
the FDIC is not representing the federal government, but "acting only
as a receiver of a failed institution." 2 Furthermore, the Court found
the interest at stake in this case to be far weaker than the instances
when the Court has invoked federal common law.53
After concluding that a federal common law standard does
not exist,5 4 the Court next questioned whether the federal statutory
law could supplant state law standards of care. 5 In answer, the Court
stated that the federal "'gross negligence' standard provides only a
floor-a guarantee that officers and directors must meet at least a
gross negligence standard. It does not stand in the way of a stricter
standard that the laws of some [s]tates provide."56 The Court based
this decision on the plain language of the statute and the legislative
history of FIRREA. 7
The Court stated that a literal reading of the savings clause in
§ 1821(k)"8 supports the interpretation that stricter state law statutes
can determine the standard of care. 59  At issue was the meaning of
statutory language protecting the FDIC's ability to pursue "any right
... under other applicable law."6° The FDIC argued that Congress
51. See id. The OTS, rather than promulgating a federal regulation, interpreted the
"pre-existing judge-made federal common law standard." Id.; see also infra notes 149-51
and accompanying text.
52. Atherton, 117 S. Ct. at 673. In support of this proposition, the Court noted its
recent decision in O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79 (1994). In O'Melveny &
Myers, the Court decided that state law, rather than federal common law, governed the tort
liability standard as applied to attorneys for a federally insured S&L. See id. at 84-85.
53. See Atherton, 117 S. Ct. at 673-74. The Court cited several cases creating federal
common law that it judged to involve much more compelling circumstances. See id. For
instance, the Court mentioned cases involving conflicts between states, with federal
officials or officers, and relationships with foreign countries. See id.
54. More accurately, the Briggs standard did not survive Erie. See id. at 674.
55. See id.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 674-76.
58. The last sentence of the statute is popularly referred to as the savings clause. It
reads: "Nothing in this paragraph shall impair or affect any right of the Corporation
[meaning the FDICIRTC] under other applicable law." 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (1994).
59. See Atherton, 117 S. Ct. at 675.
60. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k).
1998]
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only meant to preserve any other rights in the FIRREA statute.6
However, the Court rejected this limited interpretation and broadly
read the phrase to protect any other action available in any statute,
state or federal.62 In support of its broad interpretation, the Court
noted the historical context surrounding the passage of the FIRREA
legislation.63 After the failure of many federally insured savings
associations and large payments by the federal government to insured
bank depositors, the federal government had an interest in trying to
recover these funds from negligent officers and directors." At the
same time, states concerned with attracting competent individuals for
corporate positions passed legislation "designed to limit preexisting
officer and director negligence liability."65 Therefore, explained the
Court, history supports the view that Congress responded to this state
legislation by creating a minimum standard of care that would
preserve the federal government's ability to recover funds from
negligent officers and directors.66
The Court cited statements by congressional members that
supported this reading of the statute,67  but also identified
contradictory statements, which they dismissed as inconsistent with
the overall legislative history.6 The Court primarily relied on a
Senate report that specifically addressed the interpretation of
§ 1821(k).69 The report reads: "This subsection does not prevent the
FDIC from pursuing claims under [s]tate law or under other
applicable [flederal law, if such law permits the officers or directors




65. Id. These statutes are referred to as "insulation" statutes. See infra notes 100-01
and accompanying text.
66. See Atherton, 117 S. Ct. at 675.
67. See id. For instance, Senator Riegle said: "[T]he establishment of a Federal
standard of care is based on the overriding [flederal interest in protecting the soundness of
the FDIC fund and is very limited in scope. It is not a wholesale preemption of
longstanding principles of corporate governance." See id. (quoting 135 CONG. REC.
S7,150-51 (daily ed. June 19, 1989)).
68. See id. Senator Sanford stated that he supported "provisions relating to [s]tate laws
affecting the liability of officers and directors of financial institutions" because "these
changes are essential if we are to attract qualified officers and directors to serve in our
financial institutions." See id. (quoting 135 CONG. REc. S7,150 (daily ed. June 19, 1989)).
69. See id.
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of a financial institution to be sued for violating a lower standard of
care, such as simple negligence."70 Although this language explicitly
supports the Court's interpretation, the Court acknowledged that the
report was published after enactment of the law.71 In prior cases, the
Court stated that such legislative history does not carry "substantial
weight" in interpreting statutes,72 but differentiated this report on the
grounds that it had been circulated in Congress several weeks before
the vote.
73
Finally, the Court dismissed a "complicated argument" made
by the petitioner to displace federal common law with an absolute
standard set by § 18211(k). 4 Starting with the "universally conceded
fact"75 that the § 1821(k) "gross negligence" standard applies to both
state and federal banks, City Federal assumed that without a state
statute the federal common law would control.76 Because the federal
common law standard is closer to simple negligence, City Federal
argued that the statute would actually be less strict and, therefore,
should be interpreted to set an absolute standard instead of a
minimum standard.77 The Court responded to this argument by
pointing out that it had already rejected City Federal's assumption
that federal common law would control in the absence of a federal
statute.7" In addition, the Court noted that § 1821(k) does not
consider federal and state banks separately. 9 Therefore, the Court
concluded that the congressional "silence" on the difference
70. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 101-19, at 318 (1989)).
71. See id. at 675.
72. See id. (citing Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 407 (1987)). In
Clarke, the Court interpreted a provision of the McFadden Act, but refused to place
"substantial weight" on comments inserted by Representative McFadden into the
Congressional Record ten days after Congress passed the Act. See Clarke, 479 U.S. at 406-
07.
73. See Atherton, 117 S. Ct. at 675.
74. See id. at 676. The officers and directors argued that federally chartered banks
should not be subject to state law and that § 1821(k) establishes an absolute standard of
gross negligence rather than a floor. See id.
75. Id. Apparently City Federal is referring to the lower court decisions that applied
§ 1821(k) to both state and federally chartered institutions. See infra notes 107-32 and
accompanying text.
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indicated that the statutory language brings both kinds of banks
within its scope. 0
In summary, the Court decided that § 1821(k) of FIRREA
establishes a minimum standard of care of gross negligence for the
officers and directors of savings associations.8" The Court held that
the statute, rather than supplanting state law, establishes a minimum
standard that state law can raise. Furthermore, the federal statutory
minimum standard of care applies to state and federally chartered
associations alike.
III. BACKGROUND LAW
Over one hundred years ago, the Supreme Court first
considered the standard of care that should be applied to the officers
and directors of a national bank. In Briggs v. Spaulding,8 4 a receiver
for a national bank sought to hold several officers and directors liable
for losses incurred by the bank on risky loans and general
mismanagement of the institution. 5 The Court held that "directors
must exercise ordinary care and prudence in the administration of the
affairs of a bank, and that this includes something more than
officiating as figure-heads. '86 Furthermore, the Court stated that the
standard of care for bank directors was "that which ordinarily
prudent and diligent men would exercise under similar
circumstances." 7
Briggs became the basis of the federal common law regarding
bank officers and directors, but the lower courts interpreted the
80. See id.
81. See supra notes 30-80 and accompanying text.
82. See supra notes 54-80 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
84. 141 U.S. 132 (1891).
85. See id. The receiver alleged that the directors failed to keep accurate books, have
regular meetings, and oversee the actions of the bank's president. See id. at 137. They
were accused of "passive negligence," the failure to act when a duty existed, but not of
"positive misfeasance." See id. at 151.
86. Id. at 165.
87. Id. at 152. Although announcing this standard, the Court found that the directors in
question had not breached their duty because, in large part, they had been directors for a
short period of time before the insolvency and did not have adequate time to examine and
supervise the operations of the bank officers. See id. at 166.
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Court's broad language in various ways."8 Some courts treated the
standard of liability as one of ordinary negligence because of the
sensitive nature of the business of banking. 9 Others have treated the
standard as one of gross negligence and have found liability only in
situations involving director omission or inaction." Regardless of
the interpretation, the standard announced in Briggs appeared to be
the starting point for the statutory language in many states.91
Under any formulation of the standard of care, historically
few directors were found liable, absent fraud or self-dealing, due to
the business judgment rule.92 Under this rule, a presumption exists
that corporate officers and directors will not be held liable for
business decisions resulting from an exercise of business judgment.93
Typically, to have the benefit of the business judgment rule
presumption, a director or officer must: (1) make the decision in
good faith; (2) honestly believe the decision is in the best interests of
the corporation; and (3) make an informed decision using due care in
the decision-making process. 94 The purpose of the rule is to allow
officers and directors to take the risks inherent in business without
fear of liability for well-informed, but ultimately unwise decisions.95
88. See Fischer, supra note 2, at 1719. After this decision, directors were expected to
balance their supervisory duties against their right to rely on subordinates. See id. The
Briggs formulation of the standard of care was so flexible that "similar fact patterns may
result in liability or absolution, depending not only on the objective circumstances and facts
but also on the judge.. .and other inscrutable factors." Id. at 1719.
89. See Steven Ramirez, The Chaos of 12 US.C. § 1821(k): Congressional
Subsidizing of Negligent Bank Directors and Officers?, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 625, 648
(1996); see also Heidi Schooner, Fiduciary Duties' Demanding Cousin: Bank Director
Liability for Unsafe or Unsound Banking Practices, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 175, 182
(1995) ("Application of the higher standard stems perhaps from the recognition that
conduct that amounts to ordinary care in the affairs of some businesses may not amount to
ordinary care in the affairs of a bank.").
90. See Stevens & Nielson, supra note 6, at 186 (citing examples where the Briggs
standard is articulated as an ordinary negligence standard, but applied as a gross negligence
standard).
91. See Fischer, supra note 2, at 1716 n.51 (citing twelve states that have adopted
"ordinary prudent" and "under similar circumstances" phrases for the standard of liability,
like the language in Briggs).
92. See generally Martin Lowy, Business Judgement Rule Looms as the Key Issue in
D&O Liability Cases, BANKING POL'Y REP., Oct. 4, 1993, available in LEXIS, BANKNG
Library, BNKPOL File.
93. See R. FRANKLIN BALori & JESSE A. FNKNLsTEIN, 1 TiE DELAWARE LAW OF
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Although commonly applied by courts as a state common law
doctrine in the general business context, the rule has been unevenly
applied to the business of banking."
Following a controversial 1985 Delaware Supreme Court
decision, states feared that the business judgment rule would no
longer provide adequate protection to officers and directors. The
court, in Smith v. Van Gorkom, 7 applying a "gross negligence"
standard, held that the directors of Trans Union Corporation breached
their duty of care.98 After Van Gorkom, states became concerned
about attracting competent officers and directors if the standard of
care was too strict.9 9 Consequently, state legislatures either revised
existing corporate laws or passed new laws limiting director
liability.' These "insulating statutes" generally limited director
liability to "'reckless, willful, and wanton boardroom
misconduct."""'
96. See Schooner, supra note 89, at 181. Although no Supreme Court case has directly
confronted this issue, some federal courts have applied the business judgement rule to bank
directors. See, e.g., FDIC v. Harrington, 844 F. Supp. 300, 306-07 (N.D. Tex. 1994); RTC
v. Vanderweele, 833 F. Supp. 1383, 1387 n.4 (N.D. Ind. 1993). These cases were decided
prior to Atherton, which never mentions the business judgement rule in interpreting
§ 1821(k).
97. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
98. See id. The court held that the decision of the board of directors of Trans Union
Corporation to approve a cash-out merger proposal was "not the product of an informed
business decision." Id. at 864. The directors, all men of considerable business experience,
spent less than two hours discussing the approval of a takeover bid. See id. at 869.
Commentators have not agreed on the basis of the court's rationale, but the decision
prompted much discussion on the application of the business judgement rule and the
interpretation of the "gross negligence" standard of care adopted by the Van Gorkom court.
See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgement Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40
Bus. LAW. 1437 (1985) (arguing that the directors' actions should have been protected by
the business judgment rule); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Trans Union
Reconsidered, 98 YALE L.J. 127 (1988) (arguing that Van Gorkom should not be analyzed
under the business judgment rule but under takeover law).
99. See Christopher S. Lam, Note, Resolution Trust Corp. v. CityFed Financial Corp.:
The State Law and Federal Common Law Distinction, 41 VILL. L. REV. 1035, 1043 (1996).
100. See id. Delaware has significant influence over the corporate law of other
jurisdictions. See, e.g., Mullen v. Academy Life Ins. Co., 705 F.2d 971, 973 n.3 (8th Cir.
1983) ("[C]ourts of other states commonly look to Delaware law ... for aid in fashioning
rules of corporate law."). As a result, many commentators feared that following Van
Gorkom would damage the business judgment rule. See Lam, supra note 99, at 1043-44 &
n.55.
101. Lam, supra note 99, at 1043 (quoting RTC v. CityFed Fin. Corp., 57 F.3d 1231,
1239 (3d Cir. 1995)). Only some state insulating statutes specifically apply to financial
institution officers and directors. See Lowy, supra note 92.
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Then in the late 1980s, public and congressional concern over
the savings and loan crisis led to the quick passage of FIRREA.
10 2
Federally insured financial institutions were failing at an alarming
rate, and Congress saw the need to try to recover some of the federal
funds used for bailouts and to fix blame on the responsible parties.' 3
Section 1821(k), as added by FIRREA, was specifically debated only
on the Senate floor.104 Perhaps due to the legislation's hasty passage,
the courts and commentators have debated the seemingly clear
language of § 1821(k).105  The main dispute arose over the
preemptive effect of this statute on state law and federal common
law.106
The Tenth Circuit became the first federal court of appeals to
address the preemptive effect of § 1821(k) in FDIC v. Canfield107 In
that case, the FDIC sued the officers and directors of a state chartered
and federally insured bank under Utah state law which established a
simple negligence standard of care.108 The district court found that
§ 1821(k) preempts state law and dismissed the claims. 109 The Tenth
Circuit reversed, and agreeing with the FDIC, held that § 1821(k)
preempts only state laws that require a higher degree of culpability
than gross negligence." 0 Relying on the "evident meaning" of the
statutory language to reach this conclusion, the court refused to
consider policy issues."'
102. See Fischer, supra note 2, at 1746-48. Under pressure from President Bush and
voters, Congress hurried the passage of legislation in response to the savings and loan
crisis. See id. at 1746. In fact, the haste with which the bill was debated in the Senate was
itself the object of Senate debate. See id. The House of Representatives took only two
months to pass its version of the FIRREA legislation. See id. at 1751. The section by
section analysis of the bill was not available until both chambers passed the legislation. See
id. at 1752; see also supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
103. See Ramirez, supra note 89, at 626-27.
104. See Fischer, supra note 2, at 1751. The Senate bill version of § 1821(k) was
revised at the urging of a number of Senators concerned that the strictness of the original
language would make attracting the best officers and directors difficult. See id. The House
of Representatives spent more time debating the FIRREA legislation but did not discuss
officer and director liability. See id. at 1751-52.
105. See supra note 6 and accompanying text; infra notes 107-32 and accompanying
text.
106. See Lam, supra note 99, at 1045.
107. 967 F.2d 443 (10th Cir. 1992).
108. See id. at 444.
109. See id.
110. See id. at 446.
111. See id. The court stated: "Unlike a state legislature making such a policy choice,
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The Ninth Circuit also considered the issue of the preemptive
effect of § 1821(k) in the case of state chartered banks. Following
the reasoning of the Tenth Circuit, the court in FDIC v.
McSweeney"' held that the statute was not intended to establish a
uniform national standard of gross negligence for federally insured,
state chartered banks."' Once again, a circuit court allowed the
FDIC to pursue a claim against the officers and directors of a failed
savings and loan based on the state standard of simple negligence.'"4
After these two cases, the trend seemed clear for state
chartered banks: officers and directors could be held liable for acts
amounting only to simple negligence. Then the Seventh Circuit was
called upon to decide if § 1821(k) preempts federal common law for
federally chartered banks.' 5 In RTC v. Gallagher,116 the RTC sued
the officers and directors of a federally chartered bank in Illinois." 7
The defendants made a familiar argument-§ 1821(k) establishes a
national standard of gross negligence for the officers and directors of
federally chartered banks."' The RTC countered that § 1821(k) does
not preempt federal common law or state law that establishes a
higher standard of care than gross negligence." 9 The district court
dismissed the claims, holding that state law did not establish a
standard that applied to federally chartered banks. The RTC sought
interlocutory appeal to determine if § 1821(k) preempts federal
common law.'
The Seventh Circuit was the first court of appeals to entertain
this precise issue.'' The court acknowledged that federal common
law applies only in a "few and restricted" situations, and if Congress
has spoken directly on a question, no federal common law can
we are in no position to weigh these factors." Id. at 448.
112. 976 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1992).
113. See id. at 536-37.
114. See id. at 538.
115. See RTC v. Gallagher, 10 F.3d 416, 418 (7th Cir. 1993).





121. See id. at 418-19 (noting that no other circuit court had directly addressed this
issue, but that a majority of district courts agreed that § 1821(k) preempts federal common
law).
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exist.' Relying on the plain language of the statute, the legislative
history, and Supreme Court rulings concerning the creation of federal
common law, the Seventh Circuit held that Congress intended to
preempt federal common law standards of negligence. 123
Having lost the federal common law approach to pursue
claims stricter than gross negligence, the RTC next argued for the
application of stricter state laws to federally chartered banks. In RTC
v. Chapman, 4 the Seventh Circuit considered whether state laws
could apply to federally chartered banks in the context of
§ 1821(k)." 5 Because the court agreed that § 1821(k) does not
preempt state laws,2 6 the court faced a choice of laws issue.127 The
court answered this question by analogy to a common principle in
corporate law known as the "internal affairs doctrine.' 2 8 Under this
principle, the law of the state of incorporation is applied to a
corporation in recognition of the "benefits of using one rule of
law."'29  Consequently, the court decided that federal law should
apply to a federally chartered bank. 3 ' Under Gallagher that federal
law was § 1821(k). 3' The consequence of this holding was that the
RTC had to prove gross negligence for federally chartered banks in
order to establish director or officer liability.
32
122. See id. at 419 (quoting Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963)).
123. See id. at 424. However, the court specifically refrained from deciding if § 1821(k)
preempts state law. See id.
124. 29 F.3d 1120 (7th Cir. 1994).
125. See id. at 1121. The court said "Here we go again." Id.
126. See id. at 1122. The court noted that two other decisions, McSweeney and
Canfield, held that § 1821(k) does not preempt state law, but made no attempt to distinguish
these cases on the ground that they concern state chartered banks. See id.; see also supra
notes 107-14 and accompanying text (discussing Canfield and McSweeney).
127. See Chapman, 29 F.3d at 1122.
128. See id. The court indicated that the internal affairs doctrine is accepted by all the
states and by the Supreme Court. See id.
129. Id.
130. See id. at 1123.
131. See id. Gallagher was also decided in the Seventh Circuit, so that precedent bound
the court. See supra notes 115-23 and accompanying text.
132. See Chapman, 29 F.3d at 1123.
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IV. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CASE
The Atherton decision appeared to settle a long running
controversy in the circuit courts regarding the proper interpretation of
§ 1821(k) for federally chartered banks. The decision that state law
controls both state and federally chartered institutions, as long as the
state standard meets a floor level of gross negligence, appeared
simple at first glance. However, a second look at the consequences
of the holding indicates that the controversy surrounding § 1821(k) is
far from settled.
Prior to the Atherton decision, a number of commentators
argued that federal common law, as established in the Briggs line of
cases, should control the standard for bank officer and director
liability.133 The arguments supporting the application of federal
common law had the attractive features of logic and simplicity on
their side: state law governs state chartered savings and loans, and
federal common law governs federally chartered savings and loans.'34
However, interpretations of the Briggs standard have varied due to
the ambiguous language used in the case. 13  Regardless of these
arguments, the Supreme Court clearly stated that federal common
law is no longer viable in this area. 3 6 By abolishing this source of
law, the Supreme Court added some certainty to determining the
standard of care for bank officers and directors.
While disagreeing on the exact standard, practitioners and
commentators both recognize the need for certainty in attracting the
most skilled people to fill director positions. 137  The Court clarified
133. See, e.g., Ramirez, supra note 89, at 648 & nn.1 16-18 (arguing that the Briggs case
established a federal common law standard of ordinary care and should be applied to
directors of federally insured banks). But see Lowy, supra note 92 (suggesting that the
Briggs case established a standard of care, but that the regulatory agencies should
promulgate regulations in order to make the state of the law clear).
134. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
135. See Christopher Tyson Gormon, Note, Liability of Directors and Officers Under
FIRREA: The Uncertain Standard of § 1821(k) and the Need for Congressional Reform, 83
KY. L.J. 653, 661 (1995).
136. See supra notes 32-54 and accompanying text.
137. See, e.g., Martin Lowy & Peter Lowy, D&O Duty of Care After Atherton Case: The
Story Isn't Over, BANKG PoL'Y REP., Mar. 17, 1997, available in LEXIS, BANKNG
Library, BNKPOL File; see also Dennis & Feinberg, supra note 6, at 768 (suggesting that
corporate directors will shy away from board positions in corporations chartered in states
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that applicable state law standards should be applied to federally
chartered savings and loans.,38 The key question that remains
unclear is which state law standard is applicable. In the few states
that have codified laws that specifically address the standard for bank
officers and directors, 3 9 the Atherton decision will be perfectly clear.
However, many more states have only general corporate law
standards for officers and directors. 40 Some of these statutes allow
the articles of incorporation to be drafted to eliminate director
liability for certain specified conduct.' 4' Presumably, these
provisions can only limit liability to gross negligence, the floor
established after Atherton. Other states specifically codify the
standard for all corporations.142 Commentators would apply general
corporate statutes, without hesitation, to bank officers and
directors. 143  Arguably, however, the business of banking requires
special consideration. State legislatures may prefer to debate the
opposing views on officer and director liability and formulate a
specific statute. States without any codification of corporate or
banking laws rely on the case law announced in their courts,
although this law is frequently very old and less than clear.'" For
with strict or unclear standards of care).
138. See supra notes 55-80 and accompanying text.
139. See, e.g., N.Y. BANKING LAW § 7015 (McKinney 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 7-1-490
(1997).
140. When the statutory requirement is phrased as "good faith" or "prudent person,"
state common law may clarify whether this is a gross or simple negligence standard. See,
e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8-30 (Supp. 1997); Myers & Chapman, Inc. v. Thomas G.
Evans, Inc., 374 S.E.2d 385, 394 (N.C. 1988) ("As the Court of Appeals correctly
determined, this portion of the instruction was erroneous because it suggested ... that
directors and managing officers are chargeable with an omniscient knowledge of the
company's affairs and are liable for damages to third parties resulting from simple
negligence. This is not the law of North Carolina.").
141. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-202 (Michie 1996); CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 204-
204.5 (West 1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1996); IOWA CODE § 490.832
(1991); KAN. CORP. CODE ANN. § 17-6002 (West 1995); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.2-
020 (Michie 1989); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.037 (1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-12-2 (Michie
Supp. 1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1006 (West Supp. 1998); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-
1.1-48 (1992); S.D. CODIIID LAWS § 47-2-58.8 (Michie 1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-
12-102 (1995); UTAI CODE ANN. § 16-10a-841 (1995); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 180.0828 (West
1992); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-19-202 (Michie 1996).
142. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 23-1-35-1 (1997); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:92 (West
1997); MAss. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 156B, § 65 (West Supp. 1997).
143. See, e.g., Fischer, supra note 2, at 1740-41; Gormon, supra note 135, at 661.
144. See Stevens & Nielson, supra note 6, at 193-231 (surveying all state standard of
care laws, codified and common law, and interpreting which level of care the state applies,
simple or gross negligence).
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officers and directors in those states, the standard will be even more
difficult to ascertain. Even if each state announces clear laws, the
standard will vary from state to state. 4 ' This ruling may provide
states, hoping to attract the banking industry, an opportunity to pass
clear laws that are no stricter than gross negligence.
However, even if state legislatures were to clarify their
banking laws, the courts will still have to determine which state's law
to apply. Due to interstate branching, a federally chartered bank
could have branches in many states with laws that could conceivably
differ.'46 The site of the main office, the main branch, the CEO's
office, or the corporate office could serve as indicators of the state
law that appropriately governs a federally chartered bank's officers
and directors.'47 Because Atherton only summarily addresses the
choice of law issue between the states, litigation is likely to continue
on this point."'
The Atherton Court brushed aside the suggestion that federal
agency regulations could determine the standard of care for officers
and directors.'49  Prior to Atherton, at least one commentator
145. See id. The Court specifically addressed this issue and determined that century old
case law announced that federally chartered banks could be subject to state law. See
Atherton, 117 S. Ct. at 672. The implicit suggestion is that this case law should make state
law standards of care for officers and directors applicable to federal banking institutions
100 years later. As a matter of law this appears true, but as a matter of practicality the
premise is not as sound.
146. See Lowy & Lowy, supra note 137.
147. See id. The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (codified at scattered sections of 12 U.S.C), provides
that the "home state" of a federally chartered institution is "[t]he state in which the main
office of the bank is located." 12 U.S.C. § 183 1u(f)(4) (1994). Although this statute does
not specifically reference laws regarding officers and directors, it may nonetheless provide
guidance in which state law to apply. Applied pursuant to the internal affairs doctrine, the
law of the state in which a bank's main office is located would most likely control in
determining officer and director liability. See Atherton, 117 S. Ct. at 673 (" [C]ourts
applying the internal affairs doctrine could find (we do not say that they will find) that the
state closest analogically to the state of incorporation of an ordinary business is the state in
which the federally chartered bank has its main office .... ").
148. See Lowy & Lowy, supra note 137; see also Stanley I. Langbein, U.S. Supreme
Court rejects FDIC's assertion that federal common law trumps state law in determining
standard of liability for officers and directors of banks, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 10, 1997, at B6,
B6 ("The [Atherton] decision did not resolve all issues confronting institution officers and
directors, and it raises far-reaching questions .... ).
149. In dicta, the Atherton Court indicated that regulations promulgated by the OTS
would not be binding without congressional authority. See Atherton, 117 S. Ct. at 673. In
the past, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency published guidelines on bank officer
and director liability. See OCC Interpretive Letter 483, Personal Liability for Monetary
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suggested regulations as a viable solution, in light of the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency's power to regulate other banking
activities."' Congress could give this suggestion life by clearly
assigning the regulatory power to the OTS or another federal
agency.' In a broader sense, the Atherton decision may signal an
end to pro-FDIC treatment following the savings and loan crisis.'52
V. CONCLUSION
Depository institutions, both state and federally chartered,
and the bank regulatory agencies have struggled with the meaning of
§ 1821(k) since its enactment. 53 The Supreme Court clarified some
long-standing debates in Atherton, which held that federal common
law does not apply in questions of officer and director liability, but
state law standards stricter than gross negligence do apply.'54
Officers and directors now face a choice of law question as to which
state standard applies.'55 In the past, the debate over § 1821(k)
focused on the level of care required of the officers and directors. 56
However, as a practical matter, the more important issue for banks
seeking to attract competent directors, and the counsel advising those
directors, is to be sure of the exact expectations of the law, no matter
how strict. Arguably, the Atherton decision has not clarified the law
in that respect. Even with the Atherton decision, officers and
Damages for Breach of Duty as a Bank Director, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 83,048, at 71,157 (May 24, 1989).
150. See Lowy & Lowy, supra note 137.
151. By alluding to the possibility in its opinion, the Court may even be inviting
Congress to specifically delegate regulatory authority. See Atherton, 117 S. Ct. at 673
("The FDIC does not claim, however, that these OTS statements, interpreting a pre-existing
judge-made federal common-law standard (i.e., that of Briggs) themselves amount to an
agency effort to promulgate a binding regulation pursuant to delegated authority.").
Previously, the Court held that if a statute is ambiguous with regard to a specific issue, then
the agency's interpretation will be given considerable deference, as long as the
interpretation is based on a permissible construction. See Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The Atherton court did not cite this case,
but one commentator raised the issue of its applicability. See Langbein, supra note 148, at
B6.
152. See Langbein, supra note 148, at B6. The O'Melveny & Myers case represents
another recent defeat for the FDIC. See id.; see also supra note 52 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 107-32 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 30-83 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 137-48 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 30-83, 107-32 and accompanying text.
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directors seeking clarity can only look to lawmakers, state or federal,
to supply sure answers through new legislation."7
STACEY TAYLOR KERN
157. The Chairperson of the House Banking Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and
Consumer Credit, Representative Roukema, announced in her tentative agenda plans to
hold hearings regarding the Atherton decision. See Roukema Subcommittee has Aggressive
Banking Agenda for 1997-98, BANKING POL'Y REP., Feb. 17, 1997, available in LEXIS,
BANKNG Library, BNKPOL File. Representative McCollum introduced House Bill 220
on January 7, 1997, which would specifically allow a business judgment rule defense for
officers and directors of depository institutions. See id. For the complete text of the current
proposed bill, see Legislation in the House of Representatives (visited Feb. 24, 1998)
<http://thomas.loc.gov>. As of February 1998, the bill was still in subcommittee and no
hearings had been convened. See id.
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